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Since the 1960’s, computers have been regularly promoted as both
the salvation of redistricting and as a strong corrupting force. On the
one hand, computing has been proposed as a way to remove human
bias from the process of drawing electoral lines through automation
and to detect gerrymanders through geographical and statistical
analysis. On the other hand, computers have been accused of
enabling redistricting authorities to effortlessly achieve any
nefarious goal. The reality is more complex: fully automated
redistricting is constrained by deep mathematical, computational,
and philosophical limits; sophisticated analysis of redistricting plans
has yielded better predictions of districts’ electoral characteristics,
but cannot serve as convincing “gerrymandering detectors.”
Although these advanced map-drawing tools have undoubtedly
made the process faster and cheaper, they have not led to any
fundamental changes in redistricting outcomes.
In the last decade, another application of computing to
redistricting has emerged—the use of computing infrastructure to
increase public participation. This use has tremendous potential to
improve the redistricting process because there are no fundamental
technical challenges to its success. Establishing standards for
accessibility and transparency, however, will be critical.
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I. INTRODUCTION: COMPUTERS AND THE PROMISE OF IMPARTIAL
REPRESENTATION
“A computer does not substitute for judgment any more than a
pencil substitutes for literacy. But writing ability without a pencil is
no particular advantage.”
1

—Robert S. McNamara

All electoral systems aggregate voters’ choices into a collective
outcome. Because no electoral system satisfies all values one might
desire, the choice of electoral system ultimately embodies a
2
preference among favored outcomes. District-based systems are
distinct, however, in that they incorporate the judgment of
professional political actors into the vote aggregation mechanism
vis-a-vis how individuals are partitioned within district boundaries.
Districts created by these professionals can be defined to ensure
representation for diverse communities: racial, geographical,
economical, and political.
In theory, allowing political actors to periodically redefine district
boundaries improves the quality of representation. In practice, it is
often the case that, as the old saw goes, in districting, politicians pick
voters instead of the other way around. Thus, the inherent tension of
district-based systems is that if the role of the professional is not
constrained, representation suffers, but if it is constrained too much
the system loses its distinctive characteristic—the ability to
dynamically incorporate human professional judgments into the
quality of representation.
Over the six and a half decades since the creation of the first
general purpose digital computer, computers successfully have
conquered many problems that were once considered the exclusive
domain of human experience despite the failure to create systems that
3
are recognized as generally “intelligent.” Thus, it is perhaps
unsurprising that many pose this question as a way to resolve the

1. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY: REFLECTIONS IN OFFICE 115
(1968).
2. Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328,
328–31 (1950).
3. See generally A.J. TAYLOR, WHAT EVERY ENGINEER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1989).
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inherent tension in district-based electoral systems: When it comes to
redistricting, why not just let a computer do it?
This question dates back to the 1960’s. William Vickrey was
perhaps the first to propose taming gerrymandering through
4
automation. Vickrey described an abstract algorithm for creating
5
districts based only on population and proximity. Variants of this
algorithm remain in use for redistricting research. For example, it is
quite similar to an algorithm used by Carmon Cirincione, Thomas
6
Darling, and Timothy O’Rourke four decades later. Later that
decade, Stuart Nagel produced the first computer program for
7
redistricting. Unlike Vickrey, Nagel did not claim a gerrymandering
solution, rather he sought to measure value judgments in such a way
8
to increase transparency and thereby facilitate productive debate.
Since these pioneering studies, many distinguished commentators
have advocated computer automated redistricting, including:
 President Ronald Reagan: “There is only one way to do
reapportionment—feed into the computer all the factors
9
except political registration.”
 The Supreme Court: “The rapid advances in computer
technology and education during the last two decades
make it relatively simple to draw contiguous districts of
equal population [and] at the same time to further
10
whatever secondary goals the State has.”
 Multiple journalists: “Use a computer program to draw
congressional district boundaries—one with no input for
political party, race, affluence, urbanization or any other
11
parameter now used to stack the deck.”
4. William Vickrey, On The Prevention of Gerrymandering, 76 POL. SCI. Q. 105 (1961).
5. Vickrey’s proposal never mentioned the word “computer,” but clearly implied the use
of one. The algorithm described in the proposal was one that computers of the time could
implement, and which would have been impractical in their absence. Id.
6. Carmen Cirincione, Thomas A. Darling & Timothy G. O’Rourke, Assessing South
Carolina’s 1990s Congressional Districting, 19 POL. GEOGRAPHY 189 (2000).
7. For a description of the program, see Stuart Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer
Redistricting, 17 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1965).
8. Id.
9. Tom Goff, Governor Urges Redistricting Plan Without Partisan Politics, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1972, at A3 (quoting then-Governor Ronald Reagan of California).
10. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Joseph J. David, Jr., Let a Computer Do It, WASH. POST, May 21, 2003, at
A32.
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The idea of automating redistricting to reduce or eliminate
gerrymandering is intuitively appealing, and is a recurrent theme in
political science, geography, and law. Some notable examples include
12
Evaluation and Optimization of Electoral Systems, an exploration of
the subject by mathematicians, and Michelle Browdy’s student note
13
on the subject in the Yale Law Journal. Computer programmers
outside of academia also find this an appealing approach, such as
George Clark and Brian Olsen, who created software that draws
14
compact districts.
Each decadal redistricting since 1960 brought with it tremendous
advances in computing technology and repeated promises of electoral
salvation by computer. The practical reality of what computers can do
in redistricting, and how they have been used, has been somewhat
different but, the potential for computers to introduce greater
transparency and public participation into redistricting does appear to
be a realistic, if more modest, goal.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF COMPUTER USE IN REDISTRICTING
The first proposed application of computing to redistricting was
aimed entirely at removing humans from the redistricting process by
introducing quantitative data to create ostensibly “impartial”
redistricting plans. The initial applications tended to produce
redistricting plans that did not make representational sense and thus
were not seriously considered. These innovations, nevertheless,
demonstrated that computers were useful tools to process large
amounts of data necessary to conduct redistricting under measurable
constraints such as—and most notably at the time—equal population.
Rapidly, applications of computers in the redistricting process evolved
into different forms.

12. See generally Pietro GRILLI DI CORTONA ET AL., EVALUATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1999).
13. See generally Michelle H. Browdy, Note, Computer Models and Post-Banademer
Redistricting, 99 YALE L.J. 1379 (1990).
14. See, e.g., GEORGE L. CLARK, STEALING OUR VOTES: HOW POLITICIANS CONSPIRE TO
CONTROL ELECTIONS AND HOW TO STOP THEM (2004); Redistricter: A Non-Gerrymandered
Impartial Redistricting Program, http:// code.google.com/p/redistricter/ (last visited Apr. 14,
2010)
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Table 1
A typology of computer use in redistricting.
Type of use

Description

Goal

Early Studies

Current

Geographic

Systems that aid in

Aid in the efficient

Tomlinson15

Reached

Information

capturing,

creation of maps

maturity in the

Systems

managing,

associated with data.

2000 round of

Maturity

redistricting.16

visualizing and
analyzing spatial
information
Vickrey17

Fully

Creation of legal,

Eliminate unfairness

Automated

impartial

in redistricting.

Not yet reached

redistricting

redistricting plan

faces

entirely by

fundamental

computer.

challenges.19

maturity,18 and

Nagel20

Semi-

Creation of legal

Increase

automated

plans by automated

transparency in the

Available as a
research

redistricting

systems, based on

redistricting process.

prototype,21

criteria provided by

however still

the user.

faces inherent
limitations.22

15. See generally Roger F. Tomlinson, Computer Mapping: An Introduction to the Use of
Electronic Computers in the Storage, Compilation and Assessment of Natural and Economic
Data for the Evaluation of Marginal Lands, Proceedings of the National Land Capability
Inventory Seminar (1962).
16. See generally Micah Altman, Karin Mac Donald & Michael P. McDonald, From
Crayons to Computers: The Evolution of Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER
REV. 334 (2005).
17. Vickrey, supra note 4, at 105–10.
18. Altman et al., supra note 16.
19. Micah Altman, Is Automation the Answer: The Computational Complexity of
Automated Redistricting, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 81 (1997).
20. Stuart S. Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting, 17 STAN. L. REV. 863,
863–69 (1965).
21. Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated Redistricting, 34 J.
STAT. SOFTWARE (forthcoming 2010).
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Automatically

Detect egregious
gerrymanders.

Harris;23 Reock,24
25

[VOL. 5:69

Prediction of

Indicia

identify

Tufte

electoral char-

(such as

gerrymanders

interpreting a

acteristics of

geographic

through geographic

measure by

proposed plans

compactness

or statistical analysis

Egdeworth26

has reached

measures, and

of proposed

maturity.27

measures based

redistricting plans.

These pre-

on the predicted

dictive methods

seats-votes

do not provide

curve)

statistical
evidence that
gerrymandering
caused a
particular
outcome,28 and
these models
have not been
widely accepted
as reliable
identifiers of
impermissible
gerrymanders.

Open Access

Computerized

Enhance

Altman,

systems to offer

transparency of

Donald,

access to plans, data

redistricting

for constructing

facilitate public

plans, and tools to

participation.

Mac

Just beginning
to emerge in

29

McDonald.

2000 round of
redistricting.30

create plans.

22. Altman, supra note 19.
23. Curtis C. Harris, Jr., A Scientific Method of Redistricting, 9 BEHAV. SCI. 219 (1964).
24. Ernest C. Reock, Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative
Apportionment, 5 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 70 (1961).
25. Edward R. Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 540 (1973).
26. Frances Y. Edgeworth, Miscellaneous Applications of the Calculus of Probabilities, 51 J.
ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y, 534, 534 (1898).
27. Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for
Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007).
28. Micah Altman, A Bayesian Approach to Detecting Electoral Manipulation, 21 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 39 (2002).
29. Altman et al., supra note 16.
30. Id.
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The uses of computers in the redistricting process are summarized
in Table 1. The goals most clearly distinguish each use, since the
technologies and algorithms used to accomplish the goals overlap
considerably. In the remainder of this section, we describe each of
these goals in more detail and in the sections that follow we shall
assess the state of the maturity of each: the development of
geographic information systems, algorithms that provide for fullyautomated redistricting by a computer, algorithms that provide for
semi-automated redistricting given some inputs from a user, methods
to use computers to detect the presence of gerrymandering through
violation of quantitative indicia, and how computers may be used to
improve open access to the redistricting process.
As applied to redistricting, the goal of geographic information
systems (GIS) is to aid in the efficient creation of maps associated
with data. In other words, GIS aims to support people in making
decisions about districting. By itself, this is not controversial, but many
have raised the concern that the manipulation of election data could
make gerrymanders unprecedentedly easy to create and robust in
effect. Thus, proponents of reform in this area of computing argue
that the data available to professionals who use these systems should
be artificially restricted to limit the ability to gerrymander by
exploiting computer inputs. Iowa, for example, implements this
reform strategy by preventing the legislature’s advisory redistricting
commission from considering election data or the residence of
31
incumbents while drawing districts.
The goal of automated redistricting is to eliminate unfairness.
Proponents of automated redistricting argue that human judgments
should be replaced by a set of neutral criteria such as equal
32
populations, contiguity, and compactness within and across districts.
Many proponents for automated redistricting emphasize a particular
33
neutral criterion, such as compactness, rather than a particular
computer program or algorithm. Regardless, the core argument is the
same—by automatically creating lines to optimize a particular prespecified set of criteria, we can retain a district-based system and

31. IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2008).
32. See generally Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness
as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301
(1991).
33. Id. at 301–02.
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eliminate gerrymandering. A difficulty with this approach is that
seemingly neutral criteria may lead to biased outcomes; indeed,
criteria may be chosen with a specific political outcome in mind.
The goal of semi-automated redistricting is to increase the
34
transparency of the redistricting process. In contrast to fully
automated redistricting, this approach leaves the selection of
redistricting criteria to people, and delegates the creation of a plan
35
that optimizes that chosen criteria to computers. Although both
automatic and semi-automatic redistricting may sometimes use the
same software and algorithms, fully automated redistricting
algorithms and software are often highly-tailored to the particular
criteria being advocated, whereas semi-automated algorithms must be
sufficiently flexible to allow for a wide range of criteria to be
effectively optimized. Thus, ironically, although the goals of semiautomated redistricting are “lower” than those of automated
redistricting, the costs are considerably higher due to the difficulty of
designing and implementing this type of redistricting.
The goal of quantitative indicia is to detect severe (if not all)
gerrymanders based on districts’ geographic and demographic
characteristics. Proponents have argued that various indicia are
associated with the presence of gerrymandering: Most commonly,
36
these indicia are based on some measure of geographic compactness
or on an output from the hypothetical seats-vote curve based on
37
results from the proposed districts. Although some of these
geographic criteria are theoretically calculable without a computer—
and were first calculated in the mid-1800’s—advances in computing
have rendered a wider range of politically-plausible criteria to be
calculated. It is easy, however, to conflate the prediction of electoral
characteristics of plans with the detection of gerrymanders based on
such predictions. The former has become fairly easy, whereas the
latter remains deeply challenged.

34. See Nagel, supra note 20; Browdy, supra note 13, at 1387 (expanding upon Nagel’s
argument).
35. Id.
36. See Micah Altman, Districting Principles and Democratic Representation (Mar. 31,
1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, California Institute of Technology), available at http://
thesis.library.caltech.edu/1871/.
37. For a typology of these approaches, see generally Richard G. Niemi & John Deegan,
Jr., A Theory of Political Districting, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1304 (1978).
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Finally, advocates of using computers to facilitate public access to
redistricting stress the advantages of transparency and public
38
engagement. In an article written with Karin Mac Donald, we noted
that in the 2000 round of redistricting, many states widely
disseminated redistricting data and various proposed plans during the
process for the first time. Some redistricting authorities considered
publicly-drawn plans and encouraged public comments. Those
supporting public access argued: “This change is tantalizing, since it
suggests the potential for communities to examine the effects of plans
39
on them, and to propose alternatives.” This public access aspect has a
widely unrecognized potential to change the process of deliberation
over districts by opening the door to wide public and interest group
participation.
III. GIS—UBIQUITOUS AND UNJUSTLY FEARED
As computers have become more powerful, they have
undoubtedly made it easier for redistricting authorities to create and
evaluate more maps faster. At the same time, advances in
communication technology have made it possible to gather finegrained data to micro-targeting district boundaries. Many editorials
have decried that this acceleration of GIS technology and data
collection caused unprecedentedly sophisticated gerrymanders. For
example:




“Using powerful computers, line-drawers can now
determine, with nearly scientific precision, how many loyal
party voters need to be stuffed into any given district to
40
make it impregnable.”
“Mappers were able to specify a desired outcome or
outcomes—the number of people in a district, say, or the
percentage of Democrats in it—and have the program
design a potential new district instantly. These systems
allow redistricters to create hundreds of rough drafts easily

38. Altman et al., supra note 16.
39. Id. at 12.
40. Editorial, Elections With No Meaning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at A14.
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and quickly, and to choose from among them maps that
41
are both politically and aesthetically appealing.”
“Gerrymandering is not self-regulating anymore . . . the
42
software has become too good.”
“With sophisticated computer programs, politicians can
draw lines to maximize precisely their party’s
representation and minimize the other’s. The result is sham
legislative elections in which fewer and fewer seats are
competitive and moderates of both parties get squeezed
43
out of office.”

Despite these repeated observations, computer technology does
44
not appear to be at fault. Gerrymandering existed even before
Founding Father and namesake Governor Elbridge Gerry created a
salamander-shaped Massachusetts state legislative district. Computers
were primarily adopted as a redistricting tool much later, during the
1990s round of redistricting. Examining early adopter states that
could either afford the expensive computer systems or were not
barred by state law from analyzing election data during redistricting
shows there to be little correlation between gerrymandering and
redistricting outcomes.
Redistricting computer systems developed in the 1960s were
innovative for their time, but did not provide a tool to quickly analyze
calibrated changes in district boundaries with scientific precision. The
units of geography analyzed by these programs were census tracts
typically containing thousands of people, with data being entered on
unwieldy punchcards. Resource-rich states began developing
geographic information systems for redistricting purposes in the
1980s. By the 1990s, some states reported that their in-house
developed redistricting GIS programs running on mainframe
computers or state-of-the-art workstations. The software development
and the compilation of the election and census data to power the
software cost an average of $500,000, with some of the larger states
41. Don Peck & Caitlin Casey, The Nation in Numbers: Packing, Cracking, and
Kidnapping, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 50, 50–51.
42. Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab in THE BEST AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING
2004 165, 165–76 (Royce Flippin ed., 2004).
43. Editorial, The Court Punts, WASH. POST, May 2, 2004, at B6.
44. Altman et al., supra note 16 (analyzing the rise of computer assisted redistricting).
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reporting spending several millions of dollars on redistricting
45
systems.
Ten years later, all states used redistricting software. The vast
majority of states used commercially available programs capable of
running on modestly-priced desktop computers, two orders of
46
magnitude less expensive than a decade earlier. However, the core
capabilities of these systems did not change radically. Like their
predecessors, the 2000 systems simply allow redistricting authorities
to draw districts at the block level using point-and-click technology
and evaluate basic measures of redistricting plans like population
balance, party registration balance, and a few measures of
compactness. They did not provide access to advanced statistical
models, or multi-criteria optimization.
Another study we conducted with Karin Mac Donald did not find
any statistical correlation between computer use, computer
47
capabilities, or use of electoral data, and gerrymandered districts.
Moreover, the most dramatic changes in district competitiveness and
compactness that occurred over the last forty years and preceded the
widespread use of computers in the 1990s. Instead, the introduction of
equal-population standards, which lead to the corrosion of use of
whole counties, and the widespread use of block-level databases in
the 1980s, appears to have been much more closely related to the
48
increased ability of redistricting authorities to fine-tune districts. As
Bruce Cain relates in his case study of California’s redistricting, a
political guru like Phil Burton maintained a sophisticated database of
California’s political landscape in his head and was able to sit down
49
with pen and paper to gerrymander a complex state like California.
Computers are a useful gerrymandering tool, but they do not
necessarily replace a skilled person in this instance.

45. Id. at 337.
46. Id.
47. Micah Altman, Karin Mac Donald & Michael P. McDonald, Pushbutton
Gerrymanders, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL
REDISTRICTING (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005).
48. Id. at 61–63.
49. Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
320, 323–24 (1985).
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IV. FULLY AUTOMATIC REDISTRICTING—PROBABLY POSSIBLE,
PHILOSOPHICALLY PRESUMPTUOUS
There is a story about a very senior political scientist and a worldrenowned scholar in the field of representation who traveled to
Russia shortly after the fall of communism to lecture to the newly
formed Duma. After speaking, a newly-minted member of the
Duma approached him and asked him a question with great
earnestness.
“I have been elected as a representative,” the Duma member
asked, “so when I vote, should I vote the way I think the electors
want me to, or should I vote the way I think is right?”
“That’s a good question,” said the sage. “Scholars have been
studying this for two thousand years. And, let me just say, there are
50
many opinions.”

Although fully automated redistricting has been propounded for
forty-five years, until very recently it has been an impractical process
to pursue, except in the most limited circumstances. Even in the last
round of redistricting, there was no publicly available computer
software capable of automatically creating congressional districts
meeting minimal legal standards for equal population and contiguity,
and no state claims to have generated their districting plan through a
51
fully automated process.
Times have changed. Although no commercial program is capable
of automatic congressional redistricting, open source software
projects are coming close to being able to provide this service for
many states. The BARD system, for example, is being used
experimentally to create contiguous, compact, equal-population
districts using VTD’s and census tracts, yielding results that are
suggestive, but not yet acceptable by de minimus population
52
standards. And the “redistricter” system is able to create districts
using census blocs that are within one percent of equal population.
Neither reliably can create districts with legal population deviance,
nor would equipopulous, contiguous, and compact districts be
sufficient in the small number of states, such as Ohio, that have strict

50. This is a true story.
51. See generally Altman et al., supra note 16.
52. Redistricter, supra note 14.
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requirements to minimize splits of county and other political
boundaries. Notwithstanding this, the legality gap is narrowing rapidly
for automated redistricting.
Figure 1
Redistricting plan for California, produced with “redistricter” package.53

There are, however, two important limitations to automated
redistricting. The first limitation is mathematical: the problem of
creating optimally compact, contiguous, equal-population districts is
54
provably “NP-hard.” NP-hard partitioning problems are a class of
problems generally considered by computer scientists and
55
mathematicians to be computationally intractable and probably
impossible to create a computer program that solves these problems
optimally and reliably except in very small or limited cases.

53. BDistricting: What Districting is and What it Could be, http://bdistricting.com (last
visited May 27, 2010).
54. Altman, supra note 19, at 137–48.
55. Lance Fortnow, The Status of the P versus NP Problem, 52 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
ACM 9, 80–81 (2009). For a formal treatment of NP-Completeness see CHRISTOS M.
PAPADIMITRIOU, COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY 181–219 (1994) .
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Redistricting is unlike the “hill-climbing” optimizers used to solve
many statistical problems where there is clear path to the top of “hill,”
indicating the best solution for a mathematical function. For even a
modest-sized jurisdiction there are an infinite number of ways census
blocks can be assigned to districts. Across this infinite terrain, there
are many peaks and valleys that define a redistricting plan that has
equal population and contiguous districts minimizing the number of
split counties. Further, the objective function to optimize becomes
more complex when additional federal and state criteria are
introduced. In this situation with multiple local optima there is no
simple way to ensure that a local optimum, obtained by rearranging
census blocks into districts, is indeed the global optimum.
The computational complexity of the redistricting problem is not
limited to compact districts. Micah Altman showed that redistricting is
56
computationally difficult even without optimal compactness.
Similarly, Clemens Puppe and Attlia Tasnadi showed that both
optimal partisan gerrymanders and optimal partisan-unbiased
57
redistricting are computationally hard as well.
As might be expected from the theoretical computational
complexity of redistricting, scholars have been unsuccessful at
creating methods that yield solutions to significant problems. The
most successful of the exact solution methods—those based on
integer-programming formulations—have advanced considerably
over the last decade but are still limited to relatively small problems.
In a recent study, a group of scholars solved a redistricting problem
58
for a fixed set of redistricting criteria on a 30x30 grid. These authors
speculated these methods could be extended up to a 50x50 grid. A
typical state may have the equivalent of a 700x700 grid in absolute
numbers of census blocks, but the blocks themselves typically do not
align on a regular grid even in abstraction. Exact solution methods are
additionally difficult or impossible to extend to arbitrary redistricting
criteria. Integer programming, which is among the most general
56. Altman, supra note 19.
57. See generally Clemens Puppe & Attlia Tasnadi, Optimal Redistricting Under
Geographical Constraints: Why “Pack and Crack” Does Not Work, 105 ECON. LETTERS 93
(2009); Clemens Puppe & Attlia Tasnadi, A Computational Approach to Unbiased Districting,
MATHEMATICAL & COMPUTER MODELING 1455 (2008).
58. See generally Jeroen C.J.H. Aerts, Erwin Eisinger, Gerard B.M. Heuvelink & Theodor
J. Stewart, Using Linear Integer Programming for Multi-Site Land-Use Allocation, 35
GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 148 (2003).
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formulations for which exact solution methods are commonly used,
requires extensive expertise to reformulate complex redistricting
criteria—such as that necessitated by the Voting Rights Act—into
integer partition constraints.
Because these problems are computationally intractable to
general solutions, they are approached heuristically. Heuristics (or
heuristic algorithms) are problem-solving procedures that, while they
may yield acceptable results in practice, provide no guarantees of
yielding “good” solutions in general. Specifically, an algorithm is
heuristic if it cannot be shown to yield a correct result, or correct
within a known error of approximation, or having a known
probability of correctness. BARD, Redistricter, and every other
program that has had even limited success in automated redistricting,
use heuristics.
Computational intractability is a fundamental theoretical
limitation of automated redistricting and is problematic for semiautomated approaches as well. The computational intractability might
be overcome if the redistricting problem could be simplified greatly.
For example, an optimal solution would not be necessary if (1)
legitimate redistricting goals were limited to contiguity, equal
population, and (some idiosyncratically-defined and approximate
version of) compactness; (2) a system were developed yielded legal
plans in practice; and (3) the plans by that system yielded were better
than others proposed as measured by these agreed-upon criteria. If all
of these elements come to fruition, then there might be widespread
agreement that heuristics solutions were “good enough.”
Unfortunately, no common agreement exists on the primacy of
these goals or on the nature and measurement of representation.
Even the political neutrality of these goals is contested, as there is
evidence that compactness standards and others that emphasize
geographic criteria can have distinct partisan effects where
59
geographic patterns of support for each party differs. Justice
60
Kennedy reflected on this reality in Vieth v. Jubelirer at the
beginning of his concurrence: “The object of districting is to establish

59. See generally MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, THE MIDWEST MAPPING PROJECT (2009);
Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation, 4 ST. & POL.
Q. 415 (2004).
60. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 269 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

DO NOT DELETE

84

6/9/2010 5:42:54 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 5:69

‘fair and effective representation for all citizens.’ . . . The lack,
however, of any agreed upon model of fair and effective
61
representation makes this analysis difficult to pursue.”
Political theory does not offer a clear solution either. Hanna
Pitkin’s foundational scholarship, which identifies formalistic,
symbolic, descriptive, and substantive aspects of representation, has
62
influenced political theory, but the meaning, measurement, and
current understanding of political representation remains complex,
63
contested, and incomplete.
Legal and academic scholars suggest many plausible criteria for
evaluating the quality of districts, none of which are commonly
implemented in fully-automated redistricting systems. For example,
social scientists have suggested that the following criteria, among
64
others, should be incorporated in redistricting:







65

Neutrality or symmetry of the projected seats-vote curve.
Range of responsiveness or the range of possible vote
66
shares across which electoral results would change.
Competitiveness, maximizing the number of districts with
67
competitive margins.
Consumer surplus or minimize the number of votes for a
68
losing candidate.
69
Clustering, per se.
Continuity of representative relationship, (implying some
70
degree of incumbency protection).

61. Id.
62. See generally HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
63. See generally Nadia Urbanati & Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation in
Contemporary Democratic Theory, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 387 (2008).
64. See Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing: Deriving and Measuring Fairness
in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L.J., 1547, 1576–86 (2005) (outlining the various criteria suggested for
evaluating districts).
65. See generally Richard G. Niemi & John Deegan, Jr., A Theory of Political Districting,
72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1304 (1978).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE
ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA (2008).
69. See generally Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Richard T. Holden, Measuring the Compactness of
Political Redistricting Plans (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,456, 2007).
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85
71

Non-quantitatively defined communities of interest.
72
Further, states have these criteria:
o Coincidence with “major roads, streams, or other
natural boundaries.”
o Coincidence with census tract boundaries.
o Being “square, rectangular or hexagonal in shape
to the extent permitted by natural or political
boundaries.”
o Being “easily identifiable and understandable by
voters”.
o Facilitating
“communication
between
a
representative and his constituents.”
o Preserving “media markets.”
o Enhancing “opportunity for voters to know their
representative and the other voters he represents.”
o Aligning with “prior legislative boundaries.”
o Consistency with “political subdivisions.”
o Utilizing “vernacularly insular regions so as to
allow for the representation of common interest.”

If there was universal agreement on what “fair and effective
representation” and how it should be measured, at least
approximately, redistricting could be ‘automated’ even in the absence
of computers. We would allow anyone to propose a plan, evaluate its
representational quality using a priori agreed-upon measures, and
pick the obvious winner at the close of an appointed period of time. A
2010 Ohio House redistricting reform proposal illustrates this
73
approach. Under the Ohio proposal, anyone can propose a plan, all
submitted plans are evaluated for their representational quality (using
a codified list of measures), and the best scoring plan will then be
adopted.
70. See generally Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002).
71. See generally Benjamin Forest, Information Sovereignty and GIS: The Evolution of
“Communities of Interest” in Political Redistricting, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 425 (2004).
72. Roberto Casati, Cognitive Aspects of Gerrymandering, 20 TOPOI 203, 206–08 (2001).
73. H.J. Res. 15, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009-10).
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Practically, automated redistricted systems are not driven by any
recognized measure of district quality but by the inability to calculate
measures of chosen district qualities. Calculating any measure of
districts or a redistricting plan as a whole may require sifting through
a large amount of data. These calculations can quickly become
expensive, which limits the speed by which an algorithm can search
for a solution. The commonly recognized compactness measures that
are used in automated systems are typically modified ad-hoc or new
measures are created without rigorous peer-review concerning their
strengths and weaknesses so as to increase computational speed.
Examples of the compromises and adaptations inherent in the more
recent systems and algorithms include the following:
74

Automatic redistricting to maximize voter homogeneity.
This
definition relies on maximizing the homogeneity of voters within
districts. It is incompatible with many redistricting criteria, such as
competitiveness, responsiveness, respecting the Voting Rights Act,
and lack of bias. This algorithm assumes that voters can be
assigned to districts individually (instead of only within census
blocks), and may result in geographically non-contiguous districts
that cannot guarantee optimality as self-defined.
A q-state Pott’s model. This algorithm, used by Chung-I Chou and
S.P. Li, treats redistricting as a physics problem—a q-state Pott’s
75
model. This solution heuristically attempts to yield districts that
are contiguous, compact, and of equal population. Inherent in this
approach is the assumption that no other criteria are relevant and
that compactness can be defined exclusively as total plan boundary
minimization—a definition rarely used in practice. In addition,
optimality is not guaranteed, and Chou and Li report successfully
applying the problem to less than 450 population units
Weighted Voronoi Diagrams. This heuristic algorithm for location
districting (which is similar to political districting) is based on
weighted Voronoi diagrams. It also implicitly defines compactness

74. See generally Gregory B. Lush, Esteban Gamez & Vladik Kreinovich, How to Avoid
Gerrymandering: A New Algorithmic Solution, presented at the Eighth Annual Conference on
Intelligent Technologies (Dec. 13, 2009), available at http://www.cs.utep.edu/vladik/2007/tr0751a.pdf.
75. See generally Chung-I Chou & S. P. Li, Taming the Gerrymander—Statistical Physics
Approach to Political Districting Problem, 369 PHYSICA A: STAT. MECHANICS & ITS
APPLICATIONS 799 (2006).
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76

as boundary minimization.

A shortest split-line algorithm. This algorithm splits area
jurisdiction with alternating horizontal and vertical lines until
districts approximately equal in population are developed. This
yields districts that are roughly rectangular but not necessarily
compact by any recognized measure. Nor does it allow for any
other criteria to be incorporated. Even with these limitations, the
districts produced still vary by five percent of the population,
77
which is larger than allowed for congressional districts.
An ad-hoc heuristic method that allowed a two-fold population
difference between the largest and smallest methods. When
Toshihiro Sakaguchi and Junichiro Wada tried to use this
algorithm to automatically redistrict the Japanese Diet, it failed to
find an optimal solution once the number of population units
78
exceeded twenty.
A system using mixed-integer programming heuristics. Although
this family of heuristics is flexible enough to incorporate multiple
criteria, only population equality, contiguity, and compactness were
incorporated. This approach sought to achieve compactness by
minimizing the maximum distance between two points in a district.
Plans were generated for the nation as a whole and divided into
less than a thousand population units for four multi-state districts.
Even under these theoretical (and unrealistic) conditions, the
system was unable to produce district plans that were wellbalanced in population when the number of districts in a plan
79
exceeded four.
An ad-hoc randomized heuristic algorithm that did not explicitly
incorporate population or compactness. When used to partially
redistrict the North Carolina, it could only produce partial district

76. Id. See generally Antonio G.N. Novaes, J.E. Souza de Cursi, Arinei C.L. da Silva &
João C. Souza, Solving Continuous Location-Districting Problems with Voronoi Diagrams, 36
COMPUTERS & OPERATIONS RES. 40 (2009) (providing a heuristic algorithm).
77. See generally Pan Kai, Tan Yue & Jiang Sheng, The Study of a New Gerrymandering
Methodology (Aug. 16, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with University of Science &
Technology of China).
78. Toshihiro Sakaguchi & Junichiro Wada, Automating the Districting Process: An
Experiment Using a Japanese Case Study in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
237, 242–50 (Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman eds., 2008).
79. See generally Takeshi Shirabe, District Modeling with Exact Contiguity Constraints, 35
ENV’T & PLAN. 1 (2009).
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80

A k-means minimization heuristic. “Redistricter” is a heuristic
algorithm that essentially attempts to create districts where the
component population units are closest to one another. There is no
guarantee that any k-means heuristic algorithm will find the
optimal configuration of population units into districts within a
finite amount of time. Redistricter has undocumented
modifications, and uses an ad-hoc combination of heuristics to
81
“solve” the problem.

In theory, fully-automated redistricting merely implements
unambiguous redistricting criteria in the service of accepted
representational goals. In practice, fully-automated redistricting
criteria are modified for the sake of computational speed and to
encode the representational goals of the system designer. Thus, fullyautomated redistricting solutions put the proverbial cart before the
proverbial horse.
V. SEMI-AUTOMATED REDISTRICTING—PROBABLY PROBLEMATIC,
POSSIBLY USEFUL
Semi-automatic redistricting avoids the deep philosophical
problem faced by fully-automated redistricting. Rather than hardwire contested representational goals into the software, semiautomatic redistricting aims to be agnostic as to the choice of goals.
The redistricting authority chooses criteria, and the software merely
needs to find the optimal arrangement of districting division
according to the chosen criteria. In theory, semi-automated
redistricting increases transparency by moving the debate away from
boundary line disputes to debates about the representational and
legal constraints posed by such boundary divisions. And, in theory, the
boundary lines are simply a consequence of these higher-level
decisions.
Semi-automated redistricting is not so easy for two reasons. The
first reason is mathematical—optimization of almost any interesting
representational criteria is likely to be NP-hard. There is currently no
80. See generally David W. Peterson, Putting Chance to Work: Reducing the Politics in
Political Redistricting, 21 CHANCE 1 (2008).
81. Redistricter, supra note 14.
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known way of systematically determining the extent to which plans
generated by any particular NP-hard heuristic are “close” to the
optimum achievable. Further, many heuristics require a priori choices
for starting points (e.g. an existing districting plan), and the results are
sensitive to that choice. Since no heuristics work equally well for all
problems, any requirement to use a particular software package or set
82
of algorithms may create a hidden bias in favor of specific criteria.
This bias is not merely theoretical. For example, Frederica Ricci
and Bruno Simeone used several different general heuristics on the
same set of optimization problems and found that one of these
heuristics was much better than the others in achieving the goal of
83
compactness. Similarly, a study using three general heuristics for the
84
same school-districting plan found that the choice of starting points
85
(seed values) dramatically affected the quality of the plans.
Currently, the only openly available system for semi-automated
redistricting is BARD, a system we developed. BARD provides
methods to create, display, compare, edit, automatically refine,
evaluate, and profile political districting plans. BARD aims to provide
a framework for scientific analysis of redistricting plans and to
facilitate wider public participation in the creation of new plans. Since
redistricting is a computationally complex partitioning problem not
amenable to an exact optimization solution, BARD implements a
variety of selectable meta-heuristics that can be used to refine existing
or randomly generated redistricting plans based on user-determined
criteria. By assigning different weights to various criteria, such as
district compactness or equality of population, BARD supports
automated generation of redistricting plans and plan-profiling. These
functions permit exploration of trade-offs among criteria. The intent
of a redistricting authority may be explored by examining these tradeoffs and examining why some reasonably observable plans were not
adopted. Although we are enthusiastic about BARD, it has not solved
the computational tractability problem. The use of multiple meta82. See generally D.H. Wolpert & W.G. Macready, No Free Lunch Theorems for
Optimization, 1 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 67 (1997).
83. See generally Federica Ricci & Bruno Simeone, Local Search Algorithms for Political
Districting, 189 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL R. 1409 (2008).
84. The optimization problem induced by school districting is similar but not identical to
that of political districting.
85. See generally Marie desJardins et al., Heuristic Search and Information Visualization
Methods for School Redistricting, 28 AI MAGAZINE 59 (2007).
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heuristics can reduce the potential for hidden bias, it does not
eliminate it.
Figure 2
BARD System Diagram and Screenshots86

86. Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated Redistricting, 34 J.
STAT. SOFTWARE (forthcoming 2010).
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The second reason automated redistricting is difficult is that in
practice there is a large gap between identifying representational
values and creating criteria reflecting those values that can be
optimized in a computer. Even conceptually simple values like
“contiguity” require a host of technical choices when fed into a
computer. Is a district contiguous if it is connected in some place only
by telephone lines? By areas containing roads but not people? By
areas containing no land (with or without bridges)? Are two districts
contiguous if they cross each other at one or more points, or if one
entirely contains the other? When measuring compactness, which of
the dozens of standards should be used? Should entirely unpopulated
areas be counted? Should areas covered by water be excluded or
apportioned to neighboring land units? How should map orientation
and scale be selected? The answer to each of these questions may
yield substantially different outcomes, all of which could be claimed
to yield the “best” contiguous, compact, equal-population district.
Although semi-automated approaches foster transparency, these
approaches also can easily obscure it if the computer algorithms are
not designed and documented carefully. These obstacles warrant
caution, but they may be accounted for if there is sufficient flexibility
and transparency in the redistricting process. Allowing a range of
semi-automated systems using open-source documented algorithms,
open criteria, and publicly available data may help redistricting
authorities find plans that better meet their stated goals and better
articulate why they chose a particular plan. Current commercially
available automated systems, however, are closed, black box systems
that do not lend themselves to verification that criteria were
implemented correctly and do not enable advocates for new criteria
to incorporate their recommendations into the software.
VI. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION—RELIABLE PREDICTION, NOT
CAUSAL LINKAGE
Redistricting criteria often are advocated as methods of detecting
or limiting gerrymandering. Violations of criteria may reveal
improper manipulation of districts, and such gerrymandering may be
limited by requiring redistricting authorities to draw districts subject
to certain prophylactic constraints. Although the use of redistricting
criteria preceded the development of computers, computers have
enabled a more expansive set of criteria to be calculated, including a
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set of statistical methods that provide relatively robust predictions of
the hypothetical electoral outcomes expected to arise from proposed
redistricting plans.
These criteria are typically quantitative, facially objective, strongly
propounded by their advocates (at least for a time), and generally fall
into three categories. The first category is a neutral proxy that
correlates with (at least extreme) gerrymanders, and is otherwise
“ostensibly” neutral. Compactness standards most often are
propounded on this basis. The second category of criteria predicts
probable electoral outcomes of redistricting plans. Among the many
criteria in this category that have been proposed, Andrew Gelman’s
and Gary King’s bias and responsiveness indices have received the
87
most recent scholarly recognition. The third set of criteria, which are
more rarely used, aim to detect gerrymandering directly to reveal
where a redistricting authority intended to achieve an improper goal
in creating a district plan. Advances in computer technology have
rendered a wide variety of criteria in each of these categories
relatively easy to calculate. Computers, however, have not helped
overcome inherent limitations associated with each type.
The fundamental limitation of the first type of criterion is
neutrality. We say these criteria are “ostensibly” neutral because
legislators and others in the public policy sphere have a long history
of advocating prima facie neutral reasons and methods which are in
88
fact chosen to achieve politically-motivated goals. Consider, for
example, the 1973 racial gerrymander of Mississippi county
supervisors’ districts, chronicled by Frank Parker and illustrated
89
90
below. In response to Allen v. State Board of Elections, which
invalidated at-large elections for Mississippi’s county supervisors,
Hinds County officials drew districts with the goal of equalizing
population, land area, county road mileage, and the number of bridges
(road maintenance was one of the responsibilities of county

87. See generally Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral
Systems and Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 513 (1994).
88. Robert Nozick uses the term “second-level bias” to refer to this selection of standards
or procedures, which will be applied evenly, but which are chosen to advantage a particular
group. ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 103–05 (1994).
89. FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI
AFTER 1965 155–66 (1990).
90. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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91

supervisors). Although these goals are facially neutral, the effect of
92
their application was not: simultaneously equalizing road mileage
and population created districts that split the major city in Hinds
County, where African-American voters were concentrated, and
93
resulted in a racial gerrymander.
Figure 3
Hinds County Supervisor’s Districts Adopted by the Count Board of Supervisors
94
in 1973. The gray areas represent concentrations of black population.

91.
92.
93.
94.

PARKER, supra note 89, at 153–56.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Compact districts may advantage groups or political parties
supported by geographically-dispersed populations, a scenario
95
referred to in both the dissent and concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelirer.
Respecting existing political boundaries may also produce bias by a
96
similar mechanism. An important caveat is that these generalizable
outcomes may not be applicable to all redistricting scenarios in all
jurisdictions. Drawing compact districts may result in different
outcomes in a state with several small to mid-sized cities compared to
a state with a large metropolis.
The second set of indicia is best represented by what Richard
97
Niemi and John Deegan called “neutrality,” and by what Bernard
98
Grofman and Gary King refer to as “partisan symmetry.” These
indicia are based on the seats–votes relationship. This empirical
99
relationship, first described by F.Y. Edgeworth and interpreted as a
100
measure of electoral manipulation by Edward Tufte, has been
101
The most popular of
formalized and estimated in different ways.
these methods currently is derived from predictions of how changes in
the statewide average district vote for a political party’s candidate will
translate into an expected statewide fraction of seats for the political
party. As Grofman and King argue, advances in statistical methods
(made practical by faster computers) now allow relatively easy and
102
reliable estimates of these quantities.
The prediction of plans’ electoral characteristics may be easily
conflated with the detection of gerrymandering based on these
estimates. Whereas calculating these estimates has become fairly easy,
using them to detect gerrymandering remains deeply challenged. The
fundamental limitation of these criteria is that, as Gelman and King
explain, they are predictive, not causal models, and are formally
unrelated to gerrymandering. For example, non-zero bias and low
95. See generally Micah Altman, Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on
Partisan Gerrymanders, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 989 (1998) (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 542 U.S. 267
(2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
96. MCDONALD, supra note 59.
97. Niemi & Deegan, supra note 37, at 1304–08.
98. Grofman & King, supra note 27.
99. Edgeworth, supra note 26.
100. Tufte, supra note 25.
101. See generally William LeBlanc, Party Positions and the Seats/Votes Relationship with
Ideological Voters (Aug. 6, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/42388.
102. Grofman & King, supra note 27.
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responsiveness (in the Gelman–King sense) may result from causes
other than partisan gerrymandering, such as: geographic constraints,
attempts at reducing the majoritarian-winner bonus (arguably
increasing fairness) in situations where the normal vote is not
expected to be fifty percent, a change in the proportion or location of
103
moderate voters, or the pursuit of other legitimate goals. To be
useful in policy, predictive redistricting criteria must carry a
substantive interpretation. For example, Grofman and King state that
they view measures of partisan symmetry as a “substantive standard
of fairness in districting” and not as evidence of improper intent to
104
create a gerrymander. However, courts have rejected the pursuit of
105
bias and responsiveness exclusive to other redistricting criteria.
Additionally, as discussed in the previous section, neither the courts
nor social scientists have reached consensus on what predictive
criteria should apply.
The third category (intended to detect gerrymandering by a
redistricting authority) avoids the limitations posed by the first two by
focusing directly on the likelihood that a plan was caused by an
improper motive—whether or not the plan is actually a classic
gerrymander. Formally, this can be framed as a Bayes’ factor test,
which measures the ratio of the probability that the plan would have
particular characteristics, such as the number of Democratic seats,
based on the redistricting authority’s purely partisan motives over the
probability that a plan would have the same characteristics
conditioned on a permissible motive.
Unfortunately, although such tests are easy to formulate, they are
impossible to estimate because the distribution of plans under each
outcome is unknown, and it is not possible to sample or simulate from
it. Because redistricting is an NP-hard problem, it is not tractable to
enumerate the population of possible districting plans of any
reasonable size. As a consequence, no known algorithm can provide a

103. See generally Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral
Systems and Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 513 (1994); J.M. Kousser, Estimating the
Partisan Consequences of Redistricting Plans—Simply, 22 LEG. STUD. Q. 521 (1996); see also
LeBlanc, supra note 101 (illustrating an innovative formal analysis).
104. Grofman & King, supra note 27, at 9–13.
105. League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006)
(“Without altogether discounting its utility in redistricting planning and litigation, we conclude
asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship.”).
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106

truly random sample of districting plans (set partitions). Moreover,
it is unlikely that such an algorithm exists, as its presence would imply
that NP-hard decision problems could be solved using randomization,
which is widely believed to be false.
Instead, current criteria based on “random” samples of districts
use heuristics similar to the automated redistricting algorithms
discussed above. Heuristics provide no formal guarantees of
outcomes’ characteristics and are always presumably biased toward
some sort of outcome. Although the direction of the bias may be
impossible to determine, this is more than a theoretical problem.
Several recently published studies have drawn unsupportable
inferences about the characteristics of redistricting plans based on
random districting.
A study of South Carolina concludes that the state was racially
gerrymandered in the 1990s because their “random” redistricting
heuristics failed to produce plans that yielded the same number of
107
minority seats as the actual plan. This conclusion is not a valid
statistical inference, as there is no reason to believe that the
“randomized” method produced a set of plans that constituted an
unbiased random sample of possible compact, contiguous, equal108
population districting plans. Further, the analysis rejects only the
hypothesis that the actual plan is not a plan drawn based solely on
traditional districting criteria. It does not reject other plausible
hypotheses that are different from gerrymandering—for example, that
the actual plan is a random sample of plans based on other legitimate
non-racial factors, such as moderate partisanship, communities of

106. Our lengthy search of the computer science literature revealed a single method for
producing partitions of sets with a known (in this case, uniform) random sampling distribution.
These methods were invented over twenty years ago, see generally ALBERT NIJENHUIS &
HERBERT S. WILF, COMBINATORIAL ALGORITHMS (1975), but are not well known. In theory, it
is trivial to adapt these methods to sample redistricting plans using the rejection sampling
method—sampling partitions at random, rejecting any that do not constitute feasible
redistricting plans (because of violation of contiguity, population constraints, etc.) and using the
remainder to estimate the distribution of redistricting plans. Unfortunately, in practice this
approach is computationally intractable, since as the number of blocs in the plan gets larger the
ratio of feasible plans to random partitions grows exponentially smaller, and the execution time
for calculating the distribution continues to grow.
107. See generally Cirincione et al., supra note 6.
108. Although bias is an inevitable result of the use of heuristics, in this case the direction of
bias in small samples can be readily demonstrated. The appendix shows how enumeration of all
feasible redistricting plans on a 3x2 grid demonstrates how this heuristic rule biases towards the
creation of compact districts, even though compactness is not a stated criterion of the heuristic.
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interest, and protection of incumbents. Thus the analysis makes an
unwarranted causal inference that gerrymandering caused the
discrepancy.
A study of Japanese districting concludes that the Japanese Diet
was gerrymandered because the districting plan differed in
109
characteristics from those created by their heuristic. This analysis
makes errors in statistical and causal inference identical to the South
Carolina study.
A study of the United States House of Representatives draws
inferences about the effect of redistricting on congressional
polarization from a set of districts created by randomly allocating
110
split-county units to districts without replacement. Split-counties are
formed by dividing counties into whole numbers of 10,000 person
blocks and discarding remainders. Although this is a purely random
sample, and hence unbiased, it does not sample from the population
of legal districting plans. Instead it includes non-contiguous plans and
plans that are of unequal population and excludes legal plans created
from census tracts and blocks. The authors are aware of this problem
and use ad-hoc adjustments to this method to attempt to correct it,
but the amount and direction of bias and how it affects their
conclusions are indeterminate.
One of the most prominent computer science textbooks warns
against a similar assumption when designing random number
111
generators.
Another textbook cautions quite specifically,
“Generating random permutations [and other combinatoric objects]
is an important little problem that people stumble upon and often
botch up. . . you must be very careful with random [combinatorial]
generation. We recommend that you try reasonably extensive
112
experiments with any random generator before believing it.” In
other words, it is trivial to create an algorithm that does “‘random
things,”’ but it is risky to assume that such arbitrary behavior
produces statistically random results.

109. Sakaguchi & Wada, supra note 78.
110. See generally Nolan M. McCarthy, Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does
Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666 (2009).
111. DONALD E. KNUTH, 2 THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING: SEMINUMERICAL
ALGORITHMS 4–6 (3d ed. 1997).
112. STEVE SKIENA, THE ALGORITHM DESIGN MANUAL 248 (1998).
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VI. OPEN REDISTRICTING—THE NEXT WAVE
The next major change in the use of computers in redistricting will
be centered on systems that enable the public to participate in the
map drawing process. If the potential of automated redistricting and
its variants cannot be achieved due to theoretical and computational
constraints, perhaps computing advances can be leveraged to
implement more modest goals.
The idea that software, and mapping software in particular, can
enhance public participation dates back to at least the 1960s, as
previously discussed. In the last decade, however, a number of
geographers have begun to crystallize the notion of “participatory”
GIS systems, and to study “public participation GIS” more
113
systematically. In the last several years, Google’s release of the
Google Map service and related advances in online mapping have led
to more interest in what is now more colloquially known as
“collaborative” or “social” mapping.
Limited attempts at participatory redistricting pre-date the
widespread use of GIS systems. In the 1990s, some states attempted to
mitigate barriers to public participation in redistricting by providing a
public computer terminal, typically located at a state library or state
114
office, loaded with the necessary software and data to draw districts.
However, it was not until shortly after 2000 that GIS systems became
sufficiently inexpensive to contemplate their large-scale public use in
115
redistricting.
Of the eighteen states that reported providing public terminals in
2000, Arizona illustrates the potential benefits that public
participation in the redistricting process provide, as well as the
barriers that may exist. Although Arizona provided a public terminal,
only two well-organized interest groups presented complete
congressional plans to the Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission: the Coalition for Fair Redistricting—an alliance of
minority groups—and Democratic state legislative members, lead by

113. See generally Renee Sieber, Public Participation Geographic Information Systems: A
Literature Review and Framework, 96 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 491
(2006).
114. Altman et al., supra note 16.
115. See id.
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116

Democratic Congressman Ed Pastor. Still, these plans, along with
testimony from other members of the public, had an impact on
Arizona’s adopted redistricting plan. Perhaps the most apparent
effect was observed in the First Congressional district, where
Arizona’s northwest communities are connected with the Hopi
Reservation in the northeast corner of the state by a narrow neck
extending through the Grand Canyon. This oddly-shaped district was
drawn at the urging of representatives of the Hopi tribe, who did not
wish to have the same representation as their traditional enemies
(and the more numerous) Apache, who live in a reservation that
surrounds the Hopi.
In contrast to the very small number of maps created by the public
in the last round of redistricting, a simplified “redistricting game”
probably has led to more people drawing (hypothetical) redistricting
maps in the last three years than in the entire history of the nation.
Released in 2007 by creator Chris Swain of the USC Game
Innovation Lab, this redistricting system is interested in redistricting if
117
provided with a user-friendly means to participate.

116. Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings for Public Session on July 17, 2001, Arizona
Independent
Redistricting
Commission,
http://www.azredistricting.org/Meetings/
PDF/AIRCTranscriptsPublicSession7-17-01.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010); see Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission, Meetings & Transcripts, http://www.azredistricting.org/
?page=meetings (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) (providing the comprehensive transcripts of all
AIRC meetings).
117. See Michael Falcone, A Gamers Guide to Redistricting, THE CAUCUS, June 14, 2007,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/a-gamers-guide-to-redistricting/.
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Figure 4
Screen from the “Redistricting Game”, by Chris Swain

A recent Ohio mapping exercise illustrates the potential of
adapting this approach to real redistricting plans. In the summer of
2009, the Ohio Secretary of State’s office found that there may be
greater public interest in mapping redistricting plans than the Arizona
experience indicates. The Secretary of State’s office held a
redistricting competition, inviting the public to draw and submit
congressional plans evaluated on several criteria based on 2000
118
census data. Three of the fourteen submitted maps—two from Ohio
citizens and one from an Illinois state legislator and physics professor
named Mike Fortner—were declared “‘winning’” plans in that they
119
satisfied threshold criteria values. Although three plans were
rejected because they did not have an African American majority
district, all fourteen scored as politically fairer (under the Ohio

118. See Ohio Secretary of State, Ohio Redistricting Competition, http://
www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/Text.aspx?page=12303 (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) (explaining the
Ohio Secretary of State’s redistricting competition).
119. Id.
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Secretary of State’s measure) than the bipartisan congressional plan
adopted by the state legislature.
Compared to the redistricting game, the Ohio competition
attracted few participants. Yet the set of plans it created suggest that
by opening up the redistricting process more broadly to encourage
citizen participation, it is possible to discover a menu of legal
redistricting plans that are “fair” by nominally objective standards
120
advocated by various proponents of reform. By disseminating these
alternative plans, redistricting authorities may change their behavior
by using suggested district configurations to aid in fashioning their
own plans, or by reacting to media scrutiny shaming them into
producing a better plan than they might have otherwise.
Scholarly study of public participation GIS systems suggests that it
is useful to characterize participation as having different levels of
involvement and influence, ranging from observation to joint public
121
control. The last round of redistricting saw some increase in
observation in the lowest level of involvement, as measured by “hits”
on state redistricting websites disseminating data and other
information. While we do not expect to see collaborative redistricting
systems that give the public joint control over the process in the near
future, we do believe that the level and quality of participation can be
“upgraded.” Using collaborative redistricting systems, the public can
take an active role in the public dialogues and deliberations over
redistricting.
We envision that with an open online redistricting system, public
interest groups could draw and actively lobby for their maps, and
courts would no longer need to choose between only the maps
offered to them by the political parties during litigation. Academic
scholars and expert witnesses could use the program to explore
hypothetical scenarios to test the motivations and outcomes of
redistricting. Perhaps even politicians would be interested in the
software as a means to remove “politics” from the process. However,
on this last point, we should not be blind to the prospect of politicians
using the program to help maximize their political goals.

120. Altman & McDonald, supra note 21.
121. Sieber, supra note 113, at 500–01
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VII. THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN “OPEN” SYSTEMS
Wherever political systems are readily manipulated, it is better to
have ten thousand eyes watching than twenty. The drawing of electoral
districts is among the most frequently manipulated and least
transparent processes in democratic governance. All too often
redistricting authorities maintain their monopoly on the process by
imposing high costs to public participation. By providing the public
with information similar to that held by official decisionmakers,
increasing transparency and public participation can be a powerful
counterbalance to this monopoly on redistricting districts. This
information can lead to different outcomes and better representation.
The redistricting process does not need to be closed to the public.
Transparency can be facilitated through greater access to resources by
interested outsiders, and redistricting authorities can encourage public
participation through formal requests for public comment and the
consideration of publicly submitted redistricting plans. The optimal
redistricting plan may not be discoverable, but open redistricting may
produce a “better” outcome through the exploration of a menu of
redistricting plans generated by the public (or automated methods)
and through robust public debate over these plans’ goals. In this
manner, the adopted plan may not necessarily be the one created
behind closed doors that embodies only the preferences of political
professionals.
Increasing openness has many direct benefits. Openness can aid in
educating the public about the electoral process, empowering them to
participate in a process that engages them in shaping the
representation of their neighborhoods and communities, permiting
them to show legislators plans they support, and promoting broad
commentary and discussion.
Fostering public participation enables the public to identify their
neighborhoods and communities, promotes the creation of alternative
plans, and facilitates an exploration of a wide range of
representational possibilities. Publicly-drawn plans can provide a
measuring stick against which an official plan may be compared, and
promote the creation of a “market” for plans that support political
fairness and the representational goals of the community.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY
Complex systems are inherently difficult to make transparent. As
explained above, automated redistricting systems often give the
appearance of clarity while embedding bias in technical details.
Similarly, web-based redistricting software, if not thoughtfully
implemented and deployed, could create impressions of accessibility
and transparency that are merely illusory. Software and systems that
are used to analyze or generate plans, or reports based on that
software, can be impossible to reproduce or correctly interpret
without access to the code used to generate them. Thus, transparency
requires that:




Software used to automatically create or improve
redistricting plans that are either open-source or provide
documentation sufficient for a third party to replicate the
results using independently developed software.
Reports
analyzing
redistricting
plans
include
documentation of data, methods, and procedures sufficient
to allow a third party to verify the report.

It is becoming widely recognized that software transparency is
122
123
required for scientific replication purposes, trusted systems, and
the transparency of government actions relying heavily on computer
124
systems, such as electronic voting. Because the technical definitions
of redistricting criteria are so complex and varied, it is critical to
document the exact algorithms used when determining contiguity,
measuring compactness, “optimizing” districts, and measuring
competitiveness. Because the goals of redistricting evolve with our
understanding of representation, it is critical to allow the public to
modify the tools used for redistricting in order to better adapt them to
their own views of representation.

122. See generally MICAH ALTMAN, JEFF GILL & MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, NUMERICAL
ISSUES IN STATISTICAL COMPUTING FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST (2003).
123. See generally Rebecca T. Mercuri, Trusting in Transparency, 48 COMM. OF THE ACM
15 (2005).
124. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 141–43 (2006).
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Without the ability to inspect redistricting software, it will be
impossible to verify that algorithms for creating or evaluating plans
are implemented correctly. Without a license to modify and reuse the
software, the system can only accommodate a limited set of
representational goals. Without access to previous versions of the
code, it will be impossible to replicate earlier versions of the code.
Distribution of code under an open source license through a wellknown repository, such as Sourceforge, solves these problems: an
open source license establishes the rights to inspect the code and to
build new tools with it and the repository captures the history of
changes to the system.
Still, without data, software for creating and analyzing plans is
useless. Yet state redistricting authorities can, with modest effort,
make available online a wealth of information that would
substantially lower the barriers to public participation in a
transparent manner. It is technically feasible for states to maintain
websites that provide access to redistricting data, proposed
redistricting plans, and software that enables the public to create their
own community maps and entire redistricting plans.
Some data is already readily available. The population data used
for redistricting purposes is known as the PL94-171 file—named after
the federal public law mandating its release. The Census Bureau
provides online access to the geographic and population information
necessary to use this data for redistricting purposes. In some instances,
however, redistricting authorities may further adjust or enhance these
geographic and population data sets. For example, state law could
require that geographic entities not found in the Census Bureau’ be
respected during the redistricting process, such as townships or
communities of interest. Alternatively, a state may adjust population
counts by excluding military, students, or prisoners from their
calculations. Most states except those with specific prohibitions
enhance their population data by merging it with election returns so
probable election outcomes may be forecasted.
Creating and evaluating redistricting plans requires access not
only to demographic data but to community, and in many cases,
electoral data, as well. The public needs equal access to this data to
participate in plan creation and to verify claims made about official
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plans. To determine what is necessary to guarantee transparency, we
125
need only look to the science, in which replication and verification
are fundamental requirements. Thus, all data needed to create legal
redistricting plans should be distributed for public use, under a license
allowing reuse of the data for non-commercial purposes. Further, to
ensure that data have not been intentionally or unintentionally
modified in such a manner as to affect the redistricting outcomes, all
data should provide clear documentation of the original source, the
chain of ownership (provenance), and all modifications made to it.
The public needs easy access to the redistricting plans generated
by a redistricting authority or submitted by the public in order to
evaluate these plans. Redistricting plans released as images of districts
or by describing how districts’ borders align with existing features—
known as “‘metes and bounds”‘—are difficult to import into mapping
software. Full transparency thus requires that redistricting plans be
made available in non-proprietary formats that are easily read into
commonly used GIS systems.
Finally, on the Internet, as the joke goes, “no one knows you’re a
dog.” Websites and online service must be transparent to be
trustworthy. Services offered to the public to evaluate or create
redistricting plans are opaque and subject to misinterpretation unless
adequately documented. Transparency requires that such sites and
services provide a clear privacy policy; offer users the ability to
publish plans and make available all published plans in nonproprietary, machine analyzable formats; and provide documentation
of any organizations providing significant contributions to the
operation of the service.
IX. PROMOTING PARTICIPATION
Even the most transparent redistricting computer system will not
curb gerrymandering if it is not used. Surveys consistently find that
the public has little knowledge about the most basic components of
126
the redistricting process. For a redistricting system to encourage
125. See, e.g., Nature Staff, Special: Data Sharing, 461 NATURE 145 (2009); COMMISSION ON
BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES AND EDUCATION, SHARING RESEARCH DATA (Stephen
E. Fienberg, Margaret E. Martin & Miron L. Straf eds., 1985).
126. See, e.g., Press Release, Pew Research Center for the People & The Press, Most Have
Heard Little or Nothing About the Redistricting Debate: Lack of Competition in Elections Fails
to Stir Public (Oct. 27, 2006) (finding that eighty-nine percent of voters had heard little or
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broad participation it must overcome this information barrier. It must
be accessible, easy to use, and be accompanied by sufficient training
materials and evaluation tools to help novices draw legal redistricting
plans. It may be that these tools will be insufficient for the masses to
draw redistricting plans, but even the participation by a few people
may illuminate different approaches to drawing districts within in a
state.
Social networking has blossomed over the past decade, and we
suspect that this technology can be applied readily to redistricting.
Map drawers can work collaboratively to improve redistricting plans
that make sense for their communities. For example, a rural resident
might start drawing their redistricting plan by importing an urban
district that the NAACP believes is in compliance with the Voting
Rights Act. Redistricting authorities and other map-drawers among
the public may benefit from public commentary on various proposed
redistricting plans in order to better understand what may or may not
work in a given community.
CONCLUSION
Computers have decreased the costs of redistricting, but they are a
means and not an end to themselves. By virtue of their ability to
quickly sort through large amounts of data, computers permit the
exploration of a greater number of alternative configurations of
districts within the short period of time between the census and the
next election. Despite this technical innovation, however, the
motivations of professional political actors who currently control the
process in most states remain the same and have at best only
marginally been more easily realized by the advent of computerized
redistricting.
The common goal of those who advocate for automated methods
or use of indicia as to constrain the motivations of professionals have
monopolized their power by keeping the process opaque. We are
skeptical that technical and philosophical practicalities limit the
application of these methods. We believe, however, that these
methods can be harnessed to produce a more modest and achievable
outcome. Computers can transform redistricting by encouraging the
nothing about redistricting, and forty-seven percent of voters did not who was in charge of the
process).
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production of a broad variety of legal redistricting plans, and by
encouraging a robust public discussion over the inherent tradeoffs
these plans embody.
The primary effect of these efforts is probably not going to be
immediate or ignite aggressive reform of the redistricting process.
Rather, the existence of publicly-drawn plans empowers citizens to
participate in a process that is generally closed, provides a measuring
stick against which an official plan may be compared, and establishes
the existence of a “market” for plans that support political fairness
and community representational goals. Redistricting outputs may
change where a redistricting authority is responsive to citizen
submitted maps or, where partisan gridlock necessitates court
involvement. Judges may look more favorably on plans drawn by
citizens than those drawn by redistricting authorities or politicians.
Reform may follow if a plan adopted by a redistricting authority is
not as strong as that demanded by the public, which now has both
knowledge of and a vested interest in the redistricting process.
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APPENDIX: PROOF OF BIAS IN THE CDR METHOD
A simple example suffices to prove the basic “computationallyintensive” method used by Cirincione, Darling, and O’Rourke (CDR)
for drawing contiguous districts does not produce a representative
sample of the population of districting plans. Consider a simple
“state” which is composed of six identically sized and populated block
groups on a 2x3 grid. Each block group is contiguous with its
127
horizontal and vertical neighbors. We divide the state into two
districts, each containing exactly three blocks and we fully enumerate
the possible districting plans and calculate the probability the CDR
algorithm will find each solution. The algorithm is biased if all
solutions do not have the same probability of discovery.
In this hypothetical state, there are three possible districting plans
(assuming that the numbering of districts is unimportant, but this
assumption does not fundamentally affect our conclusions), as shown
below:
Figure 1
Feasible contiguous redistricting plans on a 2x3 grid.
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The contiguous district generation algorithm used by CDR is very
simple, and thus amenable to formal analysis. As they describe it:
The first algorithm, the contiguity algorithm, begins by randomly
selecting a block group to serve as the “base” of the first district. It
then constructs a “perimeter list” containing the unassigned block
groups contiguous to the base block group. The program then
randomly selects a block group from the perimeter list to add to
127. By constructing the geography with “holes” so that no population units meet at a single
point, we avoid the issue of whether to treat such units as contiguous. This simplification is
taken only to clarify the exposition. In fact, decisions about how to measure contiguity (and
other criteria) are completely independent from the sampling behavior of the algorithm. Our
example only requires that contiguous relationships not be impossible, a priori.
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the emerging district and adjusts the perimeter lists. The process
continues until the population of the emerging district achieves the
desired population level . . . . The next district begins with the
random selection of a census block group from among those that
touch one of the complete districts. [And the process continues
until a legal plan is generated, or until no more legal districts can
128
be created, in which case the process is restarted.]

In a true random sample of contiguous districting plans, the
probability of the method generating each plan would be one-third.
What is the probability of generating each districting plan using
CDR’s algorithm? Using the computationally intensive “sampling”
method, the probability is lower for {1,2,3} than for the other two
129
plans. The tree below shows all of the possible sequences of choices
starting from the base block groups 1,2,3 (the paths from the bases
4,5,6 are symmetric):

128. Cirincione et al., supra note 6, at 196.
129. At first glance, one might think this bias is intended to select “compact” districts. In
fact, this method, as developed by Cirincione et al., is supposed, to select from the universe of
contiguous plans. They use a different algorithm to select compact plans.
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Figure 2
Event-trees showing the generation of the district plans in Figure 2. Each subtree is equally likely (P=1/6), and the probability of following any branch at each
node is equal to 1/(number of branches). Starred nodes indicate illegal plans, which
cause the algorithm to restart with subtree selection.
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The total probability of generating plan {1,2,3} during a single run
of CDR’s algorithm is the probability of the sum of the probabilities
of the paths
{{1,2,3}, {3,2,1}, {2,1,3}, {2,3,1}},

multiplied by two (for symmetry with starting points (4,5,6)). This
equals
(1/36+1/36+1/54+1/54)*2=5/27.

The probability of generating plan {1,4,5} (which is the same as the
probability of {1,2,4} by symmetry) is the sum of the probabilities of
the paths
{{1,2,4},{1,4,2},{2,1,4},{3,5,6}}*2,

which equals
(1/36+1/24+1/54+1/24)*2=7/27.

(The probability of having to start over is 8/27, but this does not affect
the asymmetry of accepting each plan in later rounds.) Thus, the basic
algorithm used by CDR is statistically biased, in small samples.
CDR offers no evidence at all that their method is asymptotically
unbiased. And note that unlike sampling techniques based on
statistical theory, the heuristic techniques used by CDR and others
carry with them no guarantees of unbiasedness or any other
asymptotic properties.

